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Tax legislation, fiscal authorities, and tax courts create tax uncertainty by frequent tax reforms 
and various different interpretations of the tax law. Moreover, investors generate model-
specific tax uncertainty by using simplified models that anticipate the actual tax base 
incorrectly. I analyze the effects of stochastic taxation on investment behavior in a real 
options model. The investor holds an option to invest in an irreversible project with stochastic 
cash flows. To cover the effects of both tax base and tax rate uncertainty, the investment’s tax 
payment is modelled as a stochastic process. Increased tax uncertainty has an ambiguous 
impact on investment timing. The view that tax uncertainty depresses real investment is 
rejected. A higher expected tax payment delays investment. A higher tax rate on interest 
income affects investment timing ambiguously. 
JEL Code: H25, G31. 
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The Impact of Tax Uncertainty on Irreversible Investment 
 
1. Introduction 
If taxes are integrated into capital budgeting, the investment models are typically based on 
deterministic tax rates and deterministic tax bases. In many countries, however, tax reforms 
occur frequently, especially after a new government is elected. As a consequence, taxpayers 
and tax accountants have to adapt to new tax rates and different methods of computing tax 
bases. Thus, tax policy can be regarded as a stochastic process which is difficult to be 
anticipated for investors. Furthermore, legislation is not the only source of tax uncertainty. 
Rather, there is tax uncertainty even if the tax law remains unchanged and if an investor has 
already made all economic decisions which are relevant for taxation. The reason is that 
taxpayers, fiscal authorities and tax courts may interpret tax laws and economic facts 
differently. Hence, tax uncertainty exists ex ante and ex post, i.e. prior to investment decisions 
and after investment decisions have been made. In the following, this type of tax uncertainty 
will be called fiscal tax uncertainty
1. 
However, tax uncertainty is not exclusively determined by state-run institutions. The investor 
himself may be responsible for uncertainty with respect to his tax payments. The reason is as 
follows: Since current tax laws are too complicated to be integrated in manageable models of 
capital budgeting, investors use simplified models of computing the tax base for an 
investment project. Thus, the taxes actually paid and the tax payments anticipated by the 
model can deviate. From the investor’s perspective, the deviations are stochastic, even for 
unchanged tax laws. This kind of tax uncertainty can be called model-specific tax uncertainty. 
Fiscal tax uncertainty especially affects long-term investment projects, whereas model-
specific tax uncertainty may occur for any duration of an investment project. As typically 
assumed, uncertain tax policy tends to depress investment. As a consequence, ignoring tax 
uncertainty would be misleading for investors and could probably induce harmful investment 
decisions. This paper analyzes whether this common view can be maintained when using an 
investment model based on real option theory. Moreover, I examine the impact of variations 
of different tax and non-tax parameters on individual investment behaviour. If the tax 
parameters do not affect investment decisions, the tax system is neutral. Tax neutrality can be 
defined with regard to the stochastic nature of the tax system. 
The paper is structured as follows: After a literature review on stochastic taxation in section 2, 
I describe the investment model in section 3. In section 4, the investment problem is solved 
analytically. The impact of varying tax and non-tax parameters is examined in section 5. 
                                                 
1 Scholes et al. (2005), pp. 29 ff. provide an overview of the legislative and judicial system with regard to U.S. 
taxation. 2 
Section 6 provides some remarks on the existence of neutral tax systems under tax 
uncertainty. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature  review 
The economic literature discusses the effects of tax uncertainty since more than two decades. 
The starting point was the impact of uncertain tax policy on economic welfare, beginning in 
the 1970s. Weiss (1976) analyzes random taxes in the context of tax evasion. He concludes 
that tax uncertainty can be socially useful under specific conditions. Based on effective tax 
rates, Auerbach / Hines (1987) show that anticipated changes in taxes are important 
determinants of investment behaviour and firm valuation. Alm (1988) distinguishes between 
tax base and tax rate uncertainty to derive welfare effects of tax uncertainty. He argues that 
uncertain tax policy may be rational for a revenue-maximizing government. Auerbach / Hines 
(1988) present a model of effective tax rates with time-dependent statutory tax rates, 
investment tax credits and present value of depreciation allowances to analyze the impact of 
anticipated tax reforms. However, they use a constant discount factor despite changing tax 
rates which affect the after-tax discount factor. Skinner (1988) computes the additional excess 
burden of uncertain compared with certain tax policy. Bizer / Judd (1989) use a dynamic 
general equilibrium approach, but do not report general results concerning the efficiency costs 
of random tax policy. Without particular assumptions concerning the distribution of tax 
parameters, Watson (1992) analyzes saving and investment decisions in a dynamic portfolio 
model. Under specific conditions, he finds that tax rate uncertainty tends to lower risk-taking. 
Since the late 1990s, the tax uncertainty literature focuses on the investment incentives of 
uncertain tax policy. Alvarez / Kanniainen / Södersten (1998) examine the investment effects 
of expected tax reforms with uncertain timing. They conclude that an expected reduction of 
the tax rate induces accelerated investment whereas an expected reduction of the tax base has 
the opposite effect. These findings are based on the assumption that the opportunity cost of 
investment is unaffected by taxation because the discount rate is kept constant. Pointon (1998) 
focuses on imputation tax rates following a Poisson process. Hassett / Metcalf (1999) use a 
model with an output price following a geometric Brownian motion and an uncertain 
investment tax credit to explain the effects of tax policy uncertainty on aggregate investment. 
They conclude that tax policy uncertainty tends to delay investment under a continuous-time 
random walk, but increases the capital stock under a Poisson jump process. 
Since 2000, real option theory has been regularly used to investigate the implications of tax 
uncertainty. Böhm / Funke (2000) find that the effects of tax policy uncertainty are likely to 
be small. Agliardi (2001) analyzes investment effects of uncertain investment tax credits 
following a jump-diffusion process. She finds that tax policy uncertainty delays investment. 
Panteghini (2001a) derives neutral tax systems under asymmetric taxation with tax rate 
uncertainty. Panteghini (2001b) uses a Poisson process for the tax rate. He proves that the 3 
critical investment threshold is unaffected by tax policy uncertainty which means that a 
neutral stochastic tax system exists. 
None of the papers mentioned above takes into account that changes in the nominal tax rate 
also imply variations in the after-tax discount rate. Moreover, most papers focus on single tax 
parameters like investment tax credits and do not analyze the combined effects of tax rate and 
tax base uncertainty. 
Niemann (2004) defines tax neutrality in the light of tax uncertainty more precisely. 
According to his definition, first-order neutrality requires the complete ineffectiveness of 
taxation on investment decisions. Second-order neutrality means that the stochastic nature of 
taxation does not alter investment decisions. His analysis of stochastic nominal tax rates 
includes real as well as financial investment. Since stochastic nominal tax rates affect all 
assets, a risk-free asset does not exist under tax rate uncertainty. As a consequence, the 
investment incentives of tax rate uncertainty are ambiguous. 
In a model of asset pricing under uncertainty, Sialm (2006) shows that tax uncertainty may be 
partly responsible for equity premia because price adjustments due to tax changes are larger 
for long-term assets than for short-term assets. 
Hitherto, combined investment incentives and neutrality conditions under multiple tax 
parameter uncertainty have not been discussed in the literature. Especially, the effects of 
model-specific tax uncertainty on the optimal design of model tax bases remain to be 
analyzed
2. This paper addresses these problems. 
 
3. Model  design 
3.1 General  assumptions 
Following the Dixit / Pindyck (1994) real options model, I consider an option to invest
3. This 
option can be regarded as managerial flexibility in the context of non-financial investment. 
An option to invest provides the opportunity – but not the obligation – to invest in a project 
with uncertain cash flows
4 and deterministic or stochastic initial cost. The owner of the option 
is a potential investor who faces the decision between exercising the option or continuing 
waiting. Exercise means carrying out the investment project and receiving the resulting cash 
flows. Waiting implies sacrificing cash flows but avoiding unexpectedly low cash flows. A 
real options approach always implies a “now-or-later” rather than a “now-or-never” decision 
                                                 
2 Knirsch (2006) analyzes whether detailed tax planning can be more useful than detailed planning of non-tax 
parameters. 
3 Other possible types of real options are the time-to-build option, the option to abandon, and the generalized 
option to switch. See Dixit/Pindyck (1994), Trigeorgis (1996). 
4 A similar model design for analyzing tax effects is used by Niemann (1999), Sureth (2002) and 
Niemann/Sureth (2004). 4 
as assumed in traditional models of capital budgeting. Therefore, an investment project that 
could be realized immediately has to be compared with the same project when realized later. 
For reasons of analytical solubility
5, I assume a perpetual option to invest and an investment 
project with infinite economic life
6. Given the value of the underlying asset, which is given by 
the investment project’s present value, the value of the option to invest can be determined. An 
option to invest always contains economic value because postponing an investment decision 
enables to avoid negative net present values resulting from unexpected unfavourable market 
developments. 
I will assume that the investment is completely irreversible. This means that the investor is 
infinitely bound to the project as soon as he decides to invest. There is no flexibility to sell the 
investment project at a later point of time. 
Modelling the investment project’s initial outlay as a stochastic variable does not provide 
additional insights for tax purposes. Thus, the initial outlay is assumed deterministic and 
constant and is denoted  0 I . The cash flow generated by the investment project π  follows an 
arithmetic Brownian motion
7: 
, dd t d z π ππ π ασ =+                   ( 1 )  
where  π α  and  π σ  are drift and volatility parameters, respectively. dzπ  is the increment of a 
standard Wiener process. 
As long as the option to invest is not exercised, available funds yield the risk-free constant 
capital market rate r  which is used as the pre-tax discount rate. 
In this paper, I will focus on a risk-neutral investor, because important effects of tax 
uncertainty under irreversibility can already be observed in this simplified setting
8. 
 
3.2 Tax  assumptions 
The tax payment attributable to an investment project is the product of the tax base and the 
tax rate, both of which are subject to frequent fluctuations
9. As a consequence, the tax 
payment itself rather than the tax base or the tax rate can be modelled as a stochastic process. 
                                                 
5 Analytical solutions of the investment problem are necessary for the comparative statics in section 5. 
6 Otherwise, the resulting investment problem would involve partial differential equations that could not be 
solved analytically. 
7 In financial option pricing, the prevailing stochastic process is a geometric Brownian motion. However, a 
geometric Brownian motion can only reach non-negative values. In real option theory, it is useful to take 
negative cash flows (losses) into account which is possible by assuming an arithmetic Brownian motion. 
8 Of course, it would be desirable to take risk-averse investors into consideration, but this assumption would 
complicate the analysis dramatically and make analytical solutions of the investment problem almost impossible. 
9 Alm (1988) uses a model in which either the tax rate or the tax base are uncertain. Scholes et al. (2005), 
pp. 69 f. discuss the effects of deterministically changing tax rates. 5 
I assume that the tax payment τ  follows an arithmetic Brownian motion with drift  τ α  and 
volatility  τ σ : 
, dd t d z τ ττ τ ασ =+                   ( 2 )  
where dzτ  is the increment of a standard Wiener process that can be correlated with the cash 
flow process dzπ : 
[ ] . Ed zd z d t πτ ρ =                   ( 3 )  
The parameter ρ  represents the correlation coefficient of the stochastic processes π  and τ . 
In models of deterministic taxation, there is typically a linear relation between cash flows and 
tax payment. My model also takes model-specific tax uncertainty into account and allows for 
a non-perfect (or even negative) correlation of cash flows and tax payment. 
The after-tax cash flow  τ π  which is relevant for the valuation of the investment project is 
simply defined as the difference of pre-tax cash flows π  and the tax payment τ : 
. τ π πτ =−                   ( 4 )  
Since  τ π  is defined as the difference of two arithmetic Brownian motions, it also follows an 
arithmetic Brownian motion with drift α  and volatility σ : 
, dd t d z τ π ασ =+                   ( 5 )  
 , π τ α αα =−                   ( 6 )  
 
22 2. π τπ τ σ σσ ρ σ σ =+ −                  ( 7 )  
As long as the investment is not realized, available funds are invested at the risk-free capital 
market rate r . I assume that interest income is taxed at the constant rate s. Interest taxation is 
assumed deterministic because there is neither model-specific tax uncertainty nor fiscal tax 
base uncertainty for financial investment. Furthermore, neglecting tax rate uncertainty for 
financial investment can be justified by the fact that many jurisdictions levy special tax rates 
on capital income that undergo less frequent changes. Accepting this assumption, the after-tax 
discount rate r τ  is given by: 
  () 1. rs r τ =−                    ( 8 )  
 6 
4.  Solving the investment problem 
The solution of the investment problem is given by the critical threshold 
*
τ π  of the after-tax 
cash flow at which the option to invest will be exercised. Solving the problem requires to 
determine the value of the investment project as well as the value of the option to invest. 
When the option is exercised, investment is carried out, and the investment project offers no 
flexibility at all. As a consequence, the only benefit from the project for the risk-neutral 





























∫                 ( 9 )  
Obviously, the project value increases with an increasing drift of the after-tax cash flows and 
decreases with an increasing after-tax discount rate. 
Determining the option value is necessary to derive the optimal investment rule. Since the 
owner of the option can only decide between waiting or exercising, valuation requires the 
separation of the continuation region and the stopping region. Figure 1 illustrates the situation 
graphically: 
 
Figure 1: Continuation region and stopping region. 
The analytical derivation of the option value is based on dynamic programming
10. If the 
stochastic process  τ π  is inside the continuation region at time t, reaching the stopping region 
                                                 
10 In the model presented here, constructing a hedge portfolio is considered inappropriate, because neither short 
selling of the investment project nor spanning of its cash flow distribution by existing securities is realistic. A 
comparison of dynamic programming and contingent claims analysis is provided by Niemann/Sureth (2005). 
Continuation region 
(option is kept alive) 
* π
Critical investment threshold     
= stopping region  
(option is exercised) 
π7 
and exercising the option within the next infinitesimal time interval [ ] ; tt d t +  can be excluded 
almost certainly. Since the option to invest does not provide current cash flows, its only 
benefit is a possible capital gain. A risk-neutral investor is willing to hold the option only if its 
expected increase in value  [ ] Ed F τ  equals the risk-free return on the option value F τ  during a 
time interval of length dt : 
  [ ]. rFd t Ed F ττ τ =               ( 1 0 )  
After some transformations
11, the option value in the continuation region is given by: 
  ()
1
1 , FC e
τ λπ







⎛⎞ =− + + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
. To determine the critical investment threshold, two free 
boundary conditions have to be looked at. It can be proved
12 that continuity and 
differentiability at the investment threshold are needed to ensure that the exercise is optimal. 
The value matching condition (continuity) requires the identity of the project value and the 
option value plus initial outlay at the optimal point of exercise 
*




















             ( 1 2 )  
Interpreting this boundary condition economically, it implies that a project should not be 
realized unless its benefits equal at least its costs. These costs include the initial outlay as well 
as the option value that is lost by exercising. 
The smooth pasting condition (differentiability) is derived by differentiating the value 
matching condition with respect to the random variable  τ π . It can be interpreted as the 























              ( 1 3 )  
Since the investment threshold 
*
τ π  is to be determined as part of the solution, the investment 
problem constitutes a free-boundary problem. In case of a perpetual option, the critical 
                                                 
11 A detailed derivation is provided in Appendix A. 
12 See Dixit (1993), p. 31; Dixit/Pindyck (1994), pp. 130 ff. 8 
threshold 
*














=− +               ( 1 4 )  
This critical threshold determines the optimal investment rule: If the current realisation of the 
stochastic process  τ π  is less than 
*
τ π , the investor should continue waiting and keep the 
option alive. As soon as the stochastic process reaches 
*
τ π , the investor should exercise the 
option to invest immediately. The pre-tax investment threshold 
* π  as a reference case 
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=               ( 1 6 )  
 
5.  Properties of the optimal investment rule 
The impact of tax uncertainty on investment behaviour can be analyzed by comparative 
statics, i.e. by computing the partial derivatives of the critical investment threshold 
*
τ π  with 
respect to the tax parameters  τ α ,  τ σ , and s. 





























          ( 1 7 )  
This means that an increase of the drift parameter  τ α  has an unambiguous impact on 
investment behaviour: A higher expected tax payment increases the critical investment 
                                                 
13 A detailed derivation is provided in Appendix B. 9 
threshold and tends to delay investment. In contrast, increasing the drift of the pre-tax cash 
flow process  π α  has the opposite effect. 
This result is especially relevant with regard to model-specific tax uncertainty. An investor 
whose model tax payment underestimates (overestimates) the actual tax payment would 
invest prematurely (delayed) compared to the optimal investment policy. In many models of 
capital budgeting with taxes, the tax base is simply defined as the difference of cash flows and 
depreciation deductions. This means that tax base elements like provisions, inventories, loss-
offset limitations or alternative minimum taxes are neglected. For particular industries with 
high levels of provisions or inventories, e.g., an incorrect model tax base arises which may 
induce a systematically wrong investment timing
14. 


















             ( 1 8 )  
Contrary to traditional models of capital budgeting, volatility affects investment behaviour 
even when investors are risk-neutral. This result corresponds to traditional option pricing 
theory because higher volatility ceteris paribus induces higher option values. In contrast, due 
to the risk neutrality assumption, the project value is unaffected by volatility. For profitable 
investment, the investor needs a higher project value to be compensated for the increased 
option value, which leads to a higher critical investment threshold. 
However, tax volatility is only one component of total volatility. To isolate the effects of 



































            ( 1 9 )  
Whereas the denominator in eq. (19) is strictly positive, the sign of the numerator depends on 
the correlation of the tax process and the cash flow process. Thus, the impact of higher tax 
volatility is ambiguous. Assuming a highly positive correlation, high cash flow volatility and 
                                                 
14 Knirsch (2006) analyzes the impact of various model tax bases on the anticipated future value of different 
industries in Germany. 10 
low tax volatility, an increase in tax volatility may even lower the critical investment 














              ( 2 0 )  
This apparently counterintuitive result means that increased tax rate uncertainty may 
accelerate investment under specific conditions
15. Again, the popular opinion that tax 
uncertainty always depresses investment can be disproved. 
If tax volatility always equals the product of cash flow volatility and the correlation 
coefficient, an infinitesimal change of tax volatility has no impact on investment timing, as 
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           ( 2 2 )  
If cash flow volatility exceeds tax volatility, increased cash flow volatility tends to delay 
investment. 
Whereas increasing the pre-tax interest rate reduces investment in traditional models of 
capital budgeting, real option theory shows that variations of the pre-tax interest rate r  may 
have an ambiguous impact on the critical investment threshold. Depending on the particular 
parameter setting, the critical threshold 
*
τ π  can increase, decrease, or remain constant if the 
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        (23) 
This result is illustrated in figure 2 which is based on the parameters  0 1; I =   0.08; r =  
0.04; α =   0.18 σ = : 
                                                 
15 This result corresponds to the findings by Niemann (2004). 11 








Figure 2: Partial derivative of the critical investment threshold w.r.t. the pre-tax interest rate 
as a function of s. 
In accordance with traditional capital budgeting, the project value decreases when the interest 
rate increases. However, the option value may increase, decrease, or remain constant when the 
interest rate is increased. If the reduction of the option value exceeds the reduction of the 
project value, an apparently paradox effect emerges and investment is accelerated by a higher 
pre-tax interest rate. 
Varying the tax rate s on financial investment also induces ambiguous results and depends on 
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        ( 2 4 )  
The following example illustrates this result. For the parameter setting from figure 2 





 may take either sign, 
depending on the current level of s, as is shown in figure 3: 12 








Figure 3: Partial derivative of the critical investment threshold w.r.t. the tax rate on interest 
income as a function of s. 
Obviously, the critical investment threshold can increase, decrease, or remain constant if the 
tax rate on interest income is raised. At first glance, this result seems implausible because the 
tax rate s applies only for interest income and is irrelevant for real investment. However, the 
tax rate s affects the after-tax interest rate r τ  which determines the option value. As shown 
above, the impact of interest rate variations on the option value and hence the investment 
threshold is ambiguous. 
 
6. Neutral  tax  systems 
Tax systems which do no affect investment behaviour are called neutral. Typically, neutral 
tax systems are derived assuming that cash flows and tax payments are deterministic. The 
neutrality property has to be defined more precisely
16 if tax uncertainty is taken into account. 
In a real options model, first-order neutrality requires the identity of the critical investment 
thresholds before and after taxes. Basically, it would be possible to derive neutral tax systems 
by equating the critical thresholds
17 
* π  and 
*
τ π  from eqs. (15) and (14) and solving for the 
parameters of the stochastic processes. However, it is not feasible to compare these thresholds 
directly, because the after-tax threshold 
*
τ π  is a combination of two processes whereas 
* π  is 
only based on a single process. From the neutrality condition, it follows immediately that only 
taxation with an expected value zero ( [ ] 0 sE t τ = =∀ ) could ensure first-order neutrality. As 
a consequence, this model does not allow the derivation of non-zero first-order neutral 
stochastic tax systems by identifying adequate tax process parameters. 
                                                 
16 See Niemann (2004), p. 271. 
17 For deterministic tax systems, this procedure is chosen by Niemann/Sureth (2005). 13 
However, a special case of first-order neutral stochastic taxation can be described as a 
stochastic poll tax: If a taxpayer cannot escape taxation whatever his economic decisions, 
whether investment is realized or not, then even stochastic taxation does not affect the 
investment behaviour of risk-neutral investors. Of course, such a tax system would be 
regarded politically unacceptable. 
A tax system is second-order neutral if the critical investment thresholds for stochastic and 












































          ( 2 5 )  
In this model setting, stochastic second-order neutral tax systems are characterized by a 
positive correlation of tax payment and cash flows. The volatility of the tax payment is a 
function of the cash flow volatility that ensures exactly corresponding volatilities of the pre-
tax and the after-tax cash flows. This means that any second-order neutral tax system must be 
adapted to the specific cash flow process under consideration. In reality, of course, this 
requirement is incompatible with legal certainty. Moreover, a tax system that anticipates its 
own uncertainty seems rather unrealistic. 
 
7.  Summary and conclusion 
I have analyzed the impact of tax uncertainty on optimal investment behaviour in a real 
options model, taking the effects of uncertainty and irreversibility into account. I modelled 
combined tax rate and tax base uncertainty by assuming a stochastic tax payment following an 
arithmetic Brownian motion. If the stochastic cash flow also follows an arithmetic Brownian 
motion the investment problem can be solved analytically. The solution is given by the 
critical threshold of the after-tax cash flow at which immediate investment is optimal. By 
differentiating the critical threshold with respect to the parameters of the stochastic processes, 
it is easy to perform comparative-static analyses. 
The most striking result is the finding that increased tax uncertainty does not necessarily delay 
investment. This outcome is consistent with the existing literature
18. Investment can be 
                                                 
18 See Niemann (2004). 14 
accelerated by increased tax uncertainty if tax uncertainty is small compared to cash flow 
uncertainty and if both processes are positively correlated. As expected, an increase in the tax 
payment delays investment. Both effects of varying the tax rate on interest income and the 
pre-tax interest rate are ambiguous. 
Although the investment model does not permit stochastic first-order neutral tax systems, it is 
easy to derive second-order neutral tax systems. These tax systems imply that the volatility of 
the after-tax cash flow equals the volatility of the pre-tax cash flow. 
Whereas it is rather difficult to draw immediate conclusions for tax policy, my model 
provides important insights for investors facing tax uncertainty. If investors systematically 
under- or overestimate the tax payment attributable to an investment project, wrong 
investment decisions will occur. This effect is likely if investors neglect particular tax base 
elements in their models. However, real tax systems are often too complex to be modelled in 
detail. As a consequence, it may be useful for investors to apply investment models with 
stochastic taxation rather than oversimplified or misspecified models of deterministic 
taxation. 
Modelling tax uncertainty explicitly may solve two problems simultaneously: By carefully 
estimating the parameters of the tax process in the model investors are enabled to handle 
fiscal tax uncertainty as well as model-specific tax uncertainty. Further, complexity with 
regard to the investment model’s tax base can be limited which reduces tax planning costs. 
 15 
Appendix A 
Using dynamic programming, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for valuing the option 
to invest is given by eq. (10): 
  [ ]. rFd t Ed F ττ τ =             ( A   1 )  
Since the option value F τ  is a function of the stochastic process  τ π , ordinary calculus is not 
applicable. Rather, Itô's lemma
19 is needed for transforming functions of stochastic variables. 
The stochastic differential of the time-invariant
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dt → = . Using 

















+− =           ( A   3 )  
with the general solution 
  ()
12
12 . FC e C e
τ τ λ πλ π
ττ π =+            ( A   4 )  
1 C  and  2 C  are constants to be defined, and  1 λ ,  2 λ  are the positive and negative root of the 






⎛⎞ =− ± + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
, with  1 0 λ > ,  2 0 λ < . 
For  τ π →− ∞, the value of the project becomes infinitely negative, so the option to invest 
must be worthless in this case: 
  () lim 0. F
τ
τ π π
→−∞ =             ( A   5 )  
Hence, the coefficient  1 C  is positive,  2 C  must be zero, and the option value in the 
continuation region is given by: 
  ()
1
1 . FC e
τ λ π
ττ π =             ( A   6 )  
                                                 
19 See Itô (1951), Øksendal (1998), e.g. 
20 Note that the option to invest is a perpetual option. As a consequence, the time derivative does not arise in eq. 
(A 3). 16 
Appendix B 
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